This review offers a critical mapping of the construction-in-progress of refu gees and displacement as an anthropological domain of knowledge. It situates the emergence of "the refugee" and of "refugee studies" in two ways: first, historically, by looking at the management of displacement in Europe in the wake of World War II; and second, by tracing an array of different discursive and institutional domains within which "the refugee" and/or "being in exile" have been constituted. These domains include international law, international studies, documentary production by the United Nations and other international refugee agencies, development studies, and literary studies. The last part of the review briefly discusses recent work on displacement, diaspora, and deterrito rialization in the context of studies of cultural identity, nationalisll1, transna tional cultural forms-work that helps to conceptualize the anthropological study of displacement in new ways.
edge. I situate the emergence of "the refugee" and "refugee studies" in two ways: 1. historically, by looking at the management of displacement in Europe in the wake of World War II; and 2. by tracing an array of different discursive and institutional domains within which "the refugee" and/or being "in exile" have been constituted. These domains include international law, international studies, documentary production by the United Nations and other international refugee agencies, development studies, and literary studies. The second part of this review briefly discusses recent relevant work on displacement, diaspora, and deterritorialization in the context of studies of cultural identity, national ism, transnational cultural forms-work that helps to conceptualize the anthro pological study of displacement in new ways.
"THE REFUGEE": AN EPISTEMIC OBJECT IN

CONSTRUCTION
Histories: The Birth of "the Refugee"
In mapping the historical transformations that most directly contributed to the birth of the modern, internationally recognizable figure of "the refugee," it is useful to resist positing an automatic evolution of the phenomenon or assum ing that it has had a single recognizable germ or form growing out of the "beginning" of the phenomenon in the Classical mists of time where banish ment was a form of social death-a kind of capital punishment (42:193 ; cf 117). There is no "proto-refugee" of which the modern refugee is a direct descendant, any more than there is a proto-nation of which the contemporary nation form is a logical, inevitable outgrowth.
Instead of constructing such false continuities (41:146), we might do better to locate historical moments of reconfiguration at which whole new objects can appear. In the genealogy of "the refugee," one such moment can be located in post-World War II Europe. There is a danger of Eurocentrism in looking for the global figure of the refugee in postwar Europe; yet, there are also justifica tions for this specific localization. As far as has been possible to determine, it is in the Europe emerging from World War II, that certain key techniques for managing mass displacements of people first became standardized and then globalized. 1 This does not mean there were no refugees or techniques for managing them before World War II (177:18ff; cf 87). People have always sought refuge and sanctuary. But "the refugee" as a specific social category
The emergence of such techniques was not the result of careful and considered planning. Rather, the unprecedented scale of displacement seems to have impelled the improvisation of new techniques. " [T] he total number of Europeans displaced in the six years of war ... was around thirty million. At the end of the war, of these, eleven million survivors were outside their country and in need of assistance" (177:21; cf 87:305, 107:296ff, 138, 139).
and legal problem of global dimensions did not exist in its full modern form before this period. There were specific displaced populations and specific treaties, but not a more encompassing apparatus of administrative procedures (cf 107: 8-10, 177: 18ff). The standardizing, globalizing processes of the imme diate postwar years occurred, importantly, in the institutional domain of refu gee settlement and refugee camp administration, and in the emerging legal domain of refugee law.
It was toward the end of World War II that the refugee camp became emplaced as a standardized, generalizable technology of power (40) in the management of mass displacement. 2 The refugee camp was a vital device of power: The spatial concentration and ordering of people that it enabled, as well as the administrative and bureaucratic processes it facilitated within its boundaries, had far-reaching consequences. The segregation of nationalities; the orderly organization of repatriation or third-country resettlement; medical and hygienic programs and quarantining; "perpetual screening" (173:59) and the accumulation of documentation on the inhabitants of the camps; the con trol of movement and black-marketing; law enforcement and public discipline; and schooling and rehabilitation were some of the operations that the spatial concentration and ordering of people enabled or facilitated. Through these processes, the modern, postwar refugee emerged as a knowable, nameable figure and as an object of social-scientific knowledge.
The importance of the accessibility of the camp inhabitants to documentary accumulation should not be underestimated in this connection; neither should the social fact that the Displaced Persons' camps scattered over Europe (espe cially Germany) created a whole class of people (administrators, bureaucratic functionaries, doctors, therapists) who came to be trained in refugee relief and management as well as others who had different kinds of knowledge of refu gees Gournalists, writers, academics, photographers, and the refugees them selves) (see 177:24) .
Several social histories and other descriptive documents on World War II refugee camps in Europe were written at the end of or immediately following the war (23, 58, 70, 73, 74, 78, 84, 86, 87, 91, 118, 121, 123, 127; cf 140, 145, 155, 158) . These texts are extremely useful because they enable one to see precisely how the various technologies of power associated with the care and control of refugees first became standardized practices. They show how the spatial isolation and management of refugees and displaced persons in Dis placed Persons' camps and the practices that came to characterize camp life first emerged as ad hoc, emergency, temporary measures that depended heav ily on improvisation (23, 73, 123, 173) .
Careful study of this early literature (as well as the documents generated by the organizations involved at the time) shows that refugees have not always been institutionally or discursively approached as an international humanitar ian problem (102) . Indeed, in the last years of World War II and the immediate postwar years, displaced people in Europe were classified as a military prob lem, and they were under the jurisdiction of the Displaced Persons Branch of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Throughout much of the war, the control of civilians and refugees had already been widely considered as a combat problem, and the benefits of organizing refugees "for useful service behind the combat lines" had been recognized by the military forces (123:107) . During the last two years of the war, however, the problem took on new and different implications. It was increasingly anticipated that, upon victory, the masses uprooted during the war would soon be an enormous "refugee problem" concentrated in Germany. Policy plans began to be drafted by the Allied military in 1944 in response to predictions of a great disorder to come (164:484--4 86 In spatial terms, too, the military model was important. The basic blueprint of the military camp and many of its characteristic techniques were appropri ated by those new spatial and disciplinary practices that were emerging in the 1940s refugee camps in Europe. There is bitter irony in the fact that many of the hundreds of work and concentration camps in Germany were transformed into "Assembly Centres" for refugees when the war ended (118:90, 112; 29, 30) . The interiors of the Displaced Persons' camps were also arranged into disciplinary, supervisable spaces.
SHAEF administration of the refugees was followed by several different civilian international organizations, induding IGCR (Intergovernmental Com mittee on Refugees), IRO (International Refugee Organization), and UNRRA (70, 71, 155, 172) . Sjoberg has critically analyzed the motives and practices of these early organizations (149). Finally, in 1951, the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) was established. At this point, refugees began to appear more clearly as an international social or humanitarian prob lem, rather than as a primarily military one (cf 173:47). In this transformation of "the problem" from the military to the social and humanitarian, the refugee camp as a productive device of power played a vital role. The camps made people accessible to a whole gamut of interventions, including study and documentation, and the postwar figure of the modem refugee largely took shape in these camps. Since the immediate postwar years, much excellent historical work has been done on the refugees and displaced persons who were such a prominent aspect of European life from the mid-1940s to the early 1960s (23, 71, 74, 78:55, 87, 107, 123, 140, 155, 167, 172, 173) .
Another reason Europe warrants special attention is that the principal ele ments of international refugee law and related legal instruments grew largely out of the aftermath of the war in Europe, and from what must have been a powerful sense of postwar shame and responsibility for the predicaments of the people who were fleeing the Holocaust and yet were so often refused entry when they were in the most desperate need of asylum. The Universal Declara tion of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 (146) , as was the Genocide Con vention. As Nobel has observed, "Refugee law is an inseparable part of the code of Human Rights" (116:20) . Article 14.1. of the Declaration states: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." International law pertaining to refugees has "developed within the framework of the international code of Human Rights" (116: 19; cf 93).
The most universally cited part of the basic legal definition of refugee status is as follows:
[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who [,] ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
This definition, contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (111:26-28) , is widely regarded as "the critical event in the institutionalization of the post-World War II regime" for handling refugees (177:21; cf 1, 53, 54, 67) . The Convention definition is the "universal basic definition which can pragmatically be expanded, when need arises [,] by ex tending the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through resolutions by the UN General Assembly and by the adoption of regional instruments complementary to the universally respected Geneva Con vention" (116:20) . This instrument was more encompassing than the case-by case treaties of the prewar period, but it was still only intended to address the European refugee situation (covering events occurring before January 1, 1951) and not refugees as a universal phenomenon. In response to the limitations of the 1951 Convention, other legal instruments were developed. The 1967 Pro tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed the Eurocentric geographical restriction and the war-linked time restriction (54, 111, 116, 143) . "It was with the 1967 Protocol that the Geneva Convention became the universal instru ment of refugee law" (116:21) . 5 Grahl-Madsen provides a useful summary of the many sources that list and analyze the principal legal definitions of refugees (57; cf 52, 99, 111, 147, 148) and discusses a set of terms that are often used synonymously: refugee, stateless person, displaced person. A stateless person is any individual who is not considered by any state to possess its nationality (57:77) . That is, "a person may possess a nationality or be stateless at the time when he becomes a refugee, and a refugee of the former category may retain or lose his nationality without his quality of refugee being in the least affected" (57:77) . As Simpson (cited in 57:77) has put it, "Not all stateless people are refugees, nor are all refugees technically stateless .... Statelessness is not the essential quality of a refugee, though many refugees are in fact stateless people." Displacf:d person has come to be used widely as a synonym for refugee; in a legal sense, the two terms are not interchangeable, though they overlap in substantial ways (57: 137ff) . In many cases, the former term is meant to denote internally displaced persons, i.e. those who have not crossed a national border and thus do not qualify for formal refugee status.
Beyond a practical road map into the basic legal instruments, international refugee law is beyond the scope of this review; but it is an important part of the history of the contemporary figure of the refugee. The legal apparatus that has developed in the past 50 years has been of formative importance in the orders of knowledge in which "the refugee" makes its appearance, and in practice, this legal apparatus tends to take the contemporary order of sovereign nation states as given (1).
It was not always clear that this would be so. The postwar formulation of international rights contained within it the possibility of superceding the na tional order; for many it presaged the eventual development of a world state-a world truly beyond nations. Indeed, as Cooper has observed, a notion of internationalism was for a short time elaborated in the 1940s that seemed to promise a set of universal values transcending the national. "In the forties, 'the willingness of international organizations to talk, in effect, about global social citizenship promised something more ... [-]a world of principles' rather than a Small World of separate nationalities. 6 There is still a perceptible tension between 'the internationalism of nations and the internationalism of transcen dent values'; the latter 'appears in many guises, connected by such threads as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' But, as Cooper rightly notes, 'the family of nations version of internationalism eclipses the other version from the late 1950s onward'" (F Cooper, personal communication, cited in 104:56) .
Of the people writing in this period, Arendt remains one of the most perceptive. In her 1951 study of totalitarianism, she insisted on the necessity of examining displacement through the prism of often xenophobic national states, and she explicitly traced the political and symbolic logics that had the effect of pathologizing and even criminalizing refugees (6; cf 107, 176, 177:12-13ff; for instances of pathologization, cf 25, 158) . The contemporary linkages among nationalism, racism, and immigration in Europe (2, 10,48-50, 61, 133) and elsewhere attest to the continuing relevance of Arendt's observations. Yet these relationships (among xenophobia, immigration, nationalism, and a do- 
Decolonization and the Emergence of Refugees as a Third World Problem
It is now taken as axiomatic in much of the sociologically and anthropologi cally oriented refugee literature that refugees are first and foremost a "Third World problem" or a problem of "developing countries" (55, 63, 66, 69, 129) . The period of rapid decolonization in the 1960s saw a watershed period in the modern phenomena of refugees and refugee settlement practices. The estab lishment and, in some cases, movement of nation-state boundaries, and the global consolidation of processes of extraction and impoverishment were just two factors in the emergence of the "Third World" as a vast source of refugees and migrants-and as a vast asylum zone. ? But as Zolberg et al have noted correctly, it is all too easy to oversimplify the relationship between poverty and refugee movements: "The simple notion that poverty produces refugees is inconsistent with the fact that situations of extreme economic deprivation usually have not generated population outflows claiming international refugee status" (177:260).
If we accept that poverty, political oppression, and the mass displacement of people are all global or world-systemic phenomena (43, 69, 176, 177) , then it becomes difficult to localize them (and to localize refugees, specifically) in the Third World. From the 1950s to the 1970s, as in the 1980s and 1990s, the movement of people (and the control of the movement of people S ) has been inescapably global (2, 4, 5, 49, 50) , and the political, social, and ethical responsibility for it must therefore also be globa1.9 It is estimated that 97% of the world's refugees "remain in Third World countries. The rich countries in the West have started in the 1980s to defend themselves against immigration" in what Nobel has described as an "arms race against humanitarianism" and an "escalation of unilateral measures against refugees" (116:29-30) . The same tendencies are even more evident in the 1990s. If said rich countries do not have "a refugee problem" within their borders, this fact is clearly not a simple accident of geography or history (cf 33, 45) .
"From World War Two to the end of the Cold War, decolonization and superpower conflict produced the largest number of refugees ... " (69:47-48). Thus, Mrica, for example, is not simply a continent of refugees; it is also a place of refuge.
8
"The control of the movement of people" was the working title of a graduate seminar taught by Sally Falk Moore at the Harvard University Department of Anthropology. This course led me to think about displacement in the terms laid out here.
9
In a longer historical perspective, the globality of the forced movement of people-in the form of the slave trade, for example-is a much older phenomenon (see 50).
And today, what George (45) has called the "debt boomerang" ensures a tragic stability in global cycles of impoverishment, oppression, and displacement. As Nobel (116: 29; cf 23: 19) has observed:
Some say we live in the era of the Bomb and the migrant. I would say it is the era of the refugee as very few states today encourage anything but marginal immigration and then exclusively in the interest, as it is understood, of that state. The overwhelming majority of the refugees originate in the Third World.
The direct causes of their flight are conflicts kept alive mostly by super·power politics and by weapons forged and manufactured at bargain prices in the rich countries, who export death and destruction, and import the natural and partly processed products of the poor countries. At the same time they refuse to a great extent to receive the refugees who try to escape the suffering and the sorrow generated by super-power politics.
In sum, the end of official colonialism, the emergence of the Third World, and contemporaneous transformations in dominant forms of nationalism in the wealthy states together form one relevant history in the examination of refu gees as an emergent domain of knowledge.
"THE REFUGEE" AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE: A BRIEF SURVEY OF DISCURSIVE FIELDS AND CONNECTIONS
This section traces possible or actual connections between anthropological knowledge and know ledges produced in other disciplines dealing with refu gees and displacement. The domains included have been chosen because of their specific locations in relation to the emerging frameworks and orders of knowledge that have entered the disciplinary field of anthropology, from what ever direction.
International Relations and International Security: A View from Above
Population displacement and the control of movement have long been objects of attention in international relations, the study of international security, peace studies, and related fields (55, 56, 87, 95-99, 138-140, 155) . As Loescher points out, "Refugee movements already figure prominently on the post-Cold War political and security agenda .. .. Mass migrations are frequently employed as foreign policy tools, and refugees have become instruments of warfare and military strategy .... Too often refugees are perceived as a matter for interna tional charity organizations, and not as a political and security problem. Yet refugee problems are in fact intensely political: mass migrations create domes tic instability, generate interstate tension and threaten international security" (96:4-5).
International relations as a field tends to assume a vantage point that anthro pologists, in particular, are unaccustomed to taking. Seeing large, worldwide patterns and adopting, in many cases, an administrator's gaze on the phenom ena under study, international relations produces very different kinds of knowledge than, say, long-term ethnographic research. It is important for anthropologists to consider work in this field for a number of reasons. First, there is an insistence in the work of Loescher, Zolberg et aI, and others on viewing refugee movements as inescapably political phenomena. Second, a critical, anthropological engagement with the questions and topics convention ally groupable under "international relations" might open up new theoretical spaces for conducting ethnographic research on the social imagination of war, peace, and "world order"; on the use of civilian population displacements in political struggles among states; on the global social life of the arms trade, on the interpenetrations of the language of diplomacy with the language of inter national refugee aid, and so on.
International Organizations and the "International Refugee Regime"
Numerous UN bodies deal with refugees in some capacity, but the key body is the UNHCR. The UN apparatus generates an enormous documentary outflow on refugees (see e.g. 21; 71; 125; 153:383-389; [161] [162] [163] . The bulk of this documentation is archived in the collections of the international organizations themselves (153:331), but most research libraries are also significant reposito ries of these documents. This bureaucratic and discursive domain is an impor tant source of the forms that social-scientific questions and assumptions about "refugeeness" have tended to take in recent decades. For instance, the explic itly "nonpolitical" role of international refugee agencies (95:1) clearly helps to frame the leaching-out of the immediate political histories of mass displace ment from studies that define themselves as development or policy oriented or as humanitarian (106) . Other examples of the influence of the frameworks developed by international refugee agencies on a wider world of scholarship include the widespread use of the bureaucratic UN model of the three "durable solutions" to refugee problems-repatriation, integration, and resettle ment-as well as the relative absence of critical questioning of the refugee camp as an apparatus for the control of space and movement (see "Refugee Studies" section).
The UN organizations (together with other national and international aid and relief agencies, nongovernmental organizations, charity groups, develop ment agencies, etc) have played a decisive, instrumental role in consolidating "the international refugee system" (43, 55) . Hein has observed that "an organi zation functioning as a global state is forming to manage refugee problems," and that the "very concept of 'migration' emerged from the growth of national bureaucracies .... " (69:47). Zolberg et al have also mapped the existence and effects of what they call "the international refugee regime" (177:258ft). This regime, I would suggest, has been instrumental in the recent emergence of "refugee studies" as an academic or "applied academic" specialization. Much social scientific research-whether resulting in policy recommendations, de velopment reports, or academic articles-has been conducted in more or less formal connection with (and often funded by) these international organiza tions. It can hardly be surprising that these institutional, organizational settings have had subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) effects in shaping the questions that scholars have formulated about displacement and refugee settlement.
This international regime itself seems particularly important to study now. Having grown from the domesticated version of world community that Cooper described (see above), this regime produces the social, political, and legal constructions that we now recognize as refugeeness.
Refugees as a "Problem fo r Development"
The influence of the international refugee regime on scholarship has been images especially marked in the linked figures of "refugees" and "develop ment." The settlement of refugees and other displaced people, especially in the Third World, has shown a marked tendency to be absorbed into well estab lished forms of development discourse (22, 63, 65, 66, 69, 82, 141 ; cf 35, 36) .
The domain loosely characterizable as "refugees and deVelopment" appears to have by far the largest social-scientific, documentary accumulation. For one thing, development programs targeted at refugees are often established in conjunction with the UNHCR, and these programs have offered points of entry for many social scientists. But the refugee-development link is more far-reach ing than that. Rein has argued, "Economic development and assistance to refugees are inseparable issues ... because the 'refugee' is an indicator of world system dynamics" (69:45). Many others have also called for develop ment-oriented strategies in the management of mass displacement in the Third World (but notably not generally in the First World, where the vocabulary for managing the movement of people is quite different). The argument has often been made that rather than just providing immediate emergency relief in the face of new refugee crises, the agencies involved should also concentrate on setting up mechanisms for long-term development aid to improve conditions of life for everyone in impoverished regions of the Third World (see e.g. 14, 22, 66, 79, 82, 88, 115, 154; cf 177:353, n. 6). It is in the arena of refugees and development that anthropology has been particularly visible (17, 65, 66, 72) .
While there is certainly good reason to look beyond immediate emergency relief in cases of mass displacement, it is also worth tracing precisely how the discourse of development has colonized refugee issues, and what other intel lectual or political connections have been erased and rendered unthinkable in the process. If nothing else, the development discourse on refugees has some times facilitated the continued depoliticization of refugee movements; for instead of foregrounding the political, historical processes that generated a given group of refugees, and that reach far beyond the country of asylum and the refugee camp, development projects tend to see a whole world in a refugee camp,lO
"Refugee Studies"
The fields and discursive domains thus far reviewed have contributed, un evenly, to the emergence of the new, interdisciplinary discursive domain of "refugee studies." The 1970s and especially the 1980s saw several calls for the systematization of the study of refugees. This was an era that also saw several attempts at general model building (88, 89) . The generalized label of "refugee studies" began to appear more frequently at that time (141, 152, 174) . It has emerged more recently in geography and anthropology (19, 32, 72, 128) .
Important milestones in the consolidation and institutionalization of this discursive domain occurred with the establishment in 1982 of the influential Refugee Studies Programme at the University of Oxford (128:3) and with the appearance in 1988 of the Journal of Refugee Studies. Also in 1988, the Committee on Refugee Issues (CORI) was established as a committee of the General Anthropology Division, a unit of the American Anthropological As sociation. The Committee has since published two volumes of Selected Papers on Refugee Issues (32, 72) .
The very newness of this discursive domain, refugee studies, makes diffi cult any attempt to give a comprehensive synopsis of its intellectual agenda. Case studies of specific refugee situations-often quite valuable-have multi plied rapidly. Yet it seems to be generally agreed that a broader theoretical framework has been lacking (69, 177) . On reflection, however, it seems not so much that "refugee studies" has lacked theory as that it has uncritically im ported its main theoretical ideas, often on an ad hoc basis, from other scholarly domains. As discussed above, for instance, one of the main ways in which "refugee studies" has conceived its analytical object is as a problem for devel opment, thereby linking anthropological work on displacement directly to a well established-if theoretically dubious (35)-body of work in "develop ment anthropology" (cf 14, 22, 65, 66, 79, 141) .
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Another interesting view into the development-displacement link in the African context is provided by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). According to Article 22 of this Charter (known as the Banjul Charter), "1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 2. States shall have the duty, individually and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development" (1l4:48ff).
A second mode of importation of theoretical framework occurs when stud ies of refugees fall back, as they often do, on an implicit functionalist model of society. Stein's work is an apt example of this tendency. He proposes that there is a generalizable phenomenon that can be called "the refugee experi ence" and that this experience has characteristic "stages," as outlined by Keller (80) : "perception of a threat; decision to flee; the period of extreme danger and flight; reaching safety; camp behavior; repatriation, settlement, or resettle ment; the early and late stages of resettlement; adjustment and acculturation; and, finally, residual states and changes in behavior caused by the experience" (cited in 152:321). The normative stages thus set up strongly suggest an organismic, functionalist view of society that constructs displacement as an anomaly in the life of an otherwise "whole," stable, sedentary society. As Marx among others has pointed out, "some of the often tacit assumptions on which many social anthropological studies of migration rest must be re-exam ined .... [W]e must revise our image of society as a territorially based organ ism" (109:189) .
The implicit functionalism of much work in "refugee studies" is especially clear when one is dealing with questions of identity, culture, ethnicity, and "tradition." Again and again, one finds in this literature the assumption that to become uprooted and removed from a national community is automatically to lose one's identity, traditions, and culture (103) .
It has long come naturally to us, in the theoretical apparatus of anthropol ogy, to study "indigenous peoples," "local contexts," and "closed systems," as opposed to studying the movement and traffic of people. This kind of sedenta rist analytical bias is not unique to anthropology, as the interdisciplinary literature in "refugee studies" attests. "Common notions of culture" are biased, as Clifford has observed, "toward rooting rather than travel" (26:338) . The bare fact of movement or displacement across nation-state borders is often assumed a priori to entail not a transformation but a loss of culture and/or identity (107:8, 144:29; cf 38). Stein's work (152) offers a particularly clear illustration of this sedentarist norm (103:31) . Talking about the initial "stage" of exile for refugees in general, Stein predicts, "They will confront the loss of their culture-their identity, their habits. Every action that used to be habitual or routine will require careful examination and consideration ... " (152:325). Taylor & Nathan echo this statement: "Loss of patterns of conduct is intensi fied by the uncertainty of what kind of behavior is acceptable or nonacceptable in their new environment. .." (157; cf 20, 38, 112) . The asylum country is rendered as unfamiliar as if it were worlds apart. "The refugee is searching his way through a strange and frightening society. The patterns of behavior that sustained life at home are no longer sufficient" (152:328).
Upon examination of mass displacements that become recognized as refu gee movements, it is clear that initial displacements generally occur across the nearest international border if the neighboring state is at all viable as an asylum country. It is doubtful that most people's social universe stops abruptly at the border of their own country or that the lifeworlds just across the border could be as axiomatically alien as Stein (152) suggests. Also, one would imagine that mass displacements occur precisely when one's own, accustomed society has become "strange and frightening" because of war, massacres, political terror, or other forms of violence and uncertainty. This realization is the starting point for Daniel & Knudsen's forthcoming essay (29) on re fugeeness and the breach of trust (cf 119).
The "making strange" of the asylum country often corresponds to the assumption that the homeland or country of origin is not only the normal but the ideal habitat for any person (cf 3:37), the place where one fits in, lives in peace, and has an unproblematic culture and identity. In Stein's work, this tendency is manifested in the following idealizations: "Most refugees are not poor people. They have not failed within their homeland; they are successful, prominent, well-integrated, educated individuals who fell because of fear of persecution" (152:322). Geiger, speaking of his work among Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees, similarly idealizes the worlds that his informants had left behind: "Before they became refugees, however, they had experienced lives in which there was peace, stability, enough food to eat today and tomorrow, a place in society and a future for themselves and their children" (44:68).
In the sedentarist analytical scheme, then, "[g]oing home involves only the most minor cultural adjustment problems . .. " (152: 324). To go home is to go where one belongs. But is it? Two problems present themselves right away. First, one thinks of how this sedentarist bias unintentionally mirrors the in creasingly elaborated nativism of anti-immigrant or xenophobic violence that often relies on the slogan "[Category name], go home!" (see 122). But if "home" is where one feels most safe and at ease, instead of some essentialized point on the map, then it is far from clear that returning where one fled from is the same thing as "going home." Second, recent work in other theoretical domains has shown how fraught the concept and the lived experience of home can be, and how little studied it is (12, 108, 110, 119-120). This work might be linked profitably with the growing interest in theorizing the repatriation of refugees (130, 168, 175) .
That loss of homeland is so readily linked to a presumed loss of cultural identity is one aspect of the functionalism of much work in this field. Another aspect is the uncritical use of the concepts of "adaptation" and "acculturation" to analyze processes of transformation in identity, culture, and cultural tradi tion (13, 31, 44, 51, 72, 112, 152) . This complex of ideas is strongly connected with yet another thematic tendency in refugee studies: the prominence of psychological interpretations of displacement, not only by psychologists but by other social scientists as well. As Brik et al have observed, "It is a generally accepted conclusion ... that refugees constitute a high-risk group as far as men tal health is concerned, due to the mere fact that they have been forced to emigrate" (20:179) . This is an old theme that appears widely in the World War I1-era literature on displacement (25; cf 140) and in the most recent work in anthropology (29, 32, 44:68, 72 ) and other fields (13, 20, 112, 169:213) .
It would be foolish to claim that displacement does not cause distress of many kinds, but when considering the question of psychological disorders among refugees, it is necessary to remember that we are dealing with a set of empirical questions. We cannot assume psychological disorder or mental ill n ess a priori, as an axiom, nor can we claim to know, from the mere fact of refugeeness, the actual sources of a person's suffering. This doesn't mean psychologists, psychiatrists, and other related professionals have nothing to say or do about refugees or the broader phenomenon of displacement-pat ently they do (136, 160) . Clearly, many people who have become (or have been) refugees suffer profoundly from having been tortured, raped, terrorized, spied upon, militarily attacked, separated from friends and families, and often, from having been left alive to witness death (29) . If these experiences did not have spiritual or psychological effects on people, that would be something to be explained. Thus, although many refugees have survived violence and loss that are literally beyond the imagination of most people, we mustn't assume that refugee status in and of itself constitutes a recognizable, generalizable psychological condition.
Although many displaced people might benefit from the therapeutic inter ventions of psychiatry and psychology, psychologizing modes of knowledge and therapeutic forms of relationship have too often been unreflectively im ported into the disciplinary toolkit of sociocultural anthropOlogy or sociology, subtly reinforcing the depoliticizing and dehistoricizing tendencies of the im plicit functionalism that has been already noted (44, 66, 80, 152; cf 72:5).
The Essential Refugee
The on-going systematization of the discursive domain of "refugee studies" has thus far had specific traceable effects, some intended, others not. On the one hand, it has propelled useful self-criticism among scholars who have worked on refugee-related questions (e.g. 29, 109, 174) . But on the other, it has led more often to modes of generalization and essentialization that have been less enabling. While some researchers located in "refugee studies" [e.g.
Zetter (174:102) ] have cautioned against generalizations about refugeeness, other researchers, notably Stein (152:320-321) and Keller (80) , have argued that there is such a thing as "the refugee experience," and moreover, that this generalizable experience can be differentiated into stages (cf 32. 51, 112).
Stein's paper, "The Refugee Experience: Parameters of a Field of Study," was first presented at a conference of the same title, "The Refugee Experience," sponsored by the Royal Anthropological Institute and the Minority Rights Group in London in 1980 (cf 88, 89) . Arguing that refugee problems are too often viewed (by refugees and refugee agencies) as "temporary and unique events," Stein (152:320-21; cf 88, 89) has proposed:
If we are to move toward a comprehensive professional refugee assistance system then research must be encouraged and supported. The research should focus not only on the most recent arrivals or specific policy questions but general research, looking at refugees everywhere from a broad historical perspective that views them as recurring phenomena with identifiable and often identical patterns of behavior and sets of causalities .. .. We must investigate broadly all of the stages of the refugee experience.
The construct "the refugee experience" has also been used in the emerging anthropology of refugee studies (72:2-3).
An obvious problem with the intellectual project of defining "the refugee experience" is that it posits a single, essential, transhistorical refugee condi tion.ll The quest for the refugee experience (whether as analytical model, normative standard, or diagnostic tool) reflects a wider tendency, in many disciplines, to seize upon political or historical processes and then to inscribe aspects of those processes in the bodies and psyches of the people who are undergoing them. In this way, very mobile, unstable social phenomena may be imagined as essential "traits" and "characteristics" attached to, or emanating from, individual persons. Instead of being content with seeing commonalities and differences in the socio-historical processes that produce refugees (see 176) , researchers tend to seek to fix and make permanent something "essen tial" about these processes and to do so by personalizing them.
Almost like an essentialized anthropological "tribe," refugees thus become not just a mixed category of people sharing a certain legal status; they become "a culture," "an identity" (see 152:323), "a social world" (109, cf 144), or "a community" (51). There is a tendency, then, to proceed as if refugees all shared a common condition or nature (cf 85:31, 174) .
The tendencies toward functionalism and essentialism outlined above have real consequences for the shape of interventions in refugee crises. For exam ple, functionalist visions of an identity that can only be whole and well when rooted in a territorial homeland (30, 166) reinforce the assumption that state sovereignty as we know it at the close of the twentieth century is part of a natural or necessary order of things. This mutually reinforcing relationship, in turn, can naturalize other things: (a) It naturalizes and renders reasonable the sealing of borders against applications for asylum (as the United States is now doing with Haitian asylum seekers). (b) It makes obvious the need to control the movement of people "out of place," and thus acts to naturalize technolo gies of power like the refugee camp, the transit camp, the screening or recep tion center, etc. (c) If the category "refugees" becomes another "culture," then refugees and the places where they are found come to appear as natural sites for anthropological field research. This is where it is useful to ask a battery of interconnected questions: What does it mean to be an expert or specialist on refugees? What does it (or what could it) mean to do "policy-oriented" re search? What is the proper obj ect of "refugee studies"? What are the observ able effects of a regime of practices thus labeled? 12
Problematizing the construction of the refugee as an object of knowledge invites examination of the roles that anthropologists may, or should, have in this construction. This issue (and the question of the social uses and conse quences of anthropological knowledge) has been chillingly raised by Starn (151) in his study of the War Relocation Authority and the fo rced displace ment of Japanese-American citizens of the United States during World War II. Starn traces how anthropologists working for the US government used struc tural-functionalist models of culture and community to analyze people's cir cumstances within these wartime internment camps and to advise the US relocation effort.
With the benefit of hindsight and of decades of critical reevaluation of functionalist models of "culture" and "community," it is sadly evident that there is a world of other questions and projects with which these earlier anthropologists might have engaged. But now, in 1995, the ever-growing scale and frequency of violent mass displacement, routine measures of the de facto sealing of borders, the criminalization of migrant labor and foreignness, and reactionary rhetorics of indigenousness and so-called just principles of exclu sion are contemporary phenomena that are creating vast, important fields for new political, scholarly engagements and for well-thought-out subversions of the national order of things. Before pursuing some promising new directions for such engagements, an absent connection must be identified: that between "refugee studies" and literary studies of exile.
"Exile": The Aesthetic Possibilities of Displacement
12
Although it is true that anyone prevented from returning home is an exile, some distinctions can be made between exiles, refugees, expatriates, and emigres.
Exile originated in the age-old practice of banishment. Once banished, the exile "To analyse 'regimes of practices' means to analyse programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 'jurisdiction'), and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 'veridiction')" ( 12 4:5).
lives an anomalous and miserable life, with the stigma of being an outsider. Refugees, on the other hand, are a creation of the twentieth-century state. The word "refugee" has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance, whereas "exile" carries with it, I think, a touch of solitude and spirituality.
There are shadows of international definitions of legal status in this passage from Said's essay, "Reflections on Exile" (135), but its main value in the present context is its synthetic characterization of a set of widely distributed common-sense understandings about displacement and its capacity to suggest that contemporary refugees as a mass phenomenon are subject to different representational conventions than are individual exilic figures. Into the con trast between "refugees" and those "in exile" is built a whole history of differences, not only of race, class, world region, and historical era but of different people's very different entanglements with the state and international bureaucracies that characterize the national order of things. The word "refu gees" evokes not just any persons who happen to have sought sanctuary or asylum but rather, as was suggested earlier, a "kind" of person. Many litera tures have contributed to the emergence of the figure of refugee studies, but the existing literature on exile in Said's sense does not appear to be one of these. "Exile" connotes a readily aestheticizable realm, whereas the label "refugees" connotes a bureaucratic and international humanitarian realm.
Exile is a central theme in twentieth-century literature. Said, with Steiner, has suggested that "a whole genre of twentieth-century literature is 'extraterri torial ', a literature by and about exiles" (135:159) . In her thoughtful study, Kaplan (76:13-14) has observed:
The "view from afar" characterizes the perspective of much of modernist writing .... Even those writers who do not find themselves actually exiled may easily extend the metaphor. If detachment is the precondition for original thought then disaffection and alienation as a state of mind becomes a rite of passage for the "serious" modernist writer. Following Flaubert's beliefthat the artist ought to be either a man (sic) without a country or a foreigner in his own country, the modernist seeks to recreate the effect of statelessness-whether or not the writer is, in fact, in exile. Thus, within modernism the exiled writer has come to assume a privileged position as witness and seer. ... [I]solation, solitude, alienation, and uncertainty are necessary preconditions for "great art" since it is distance and perspective that produce "vision."
These representational conventions are important because they operate not only in the domain of twentieth-century art (26, 83) and literature; they travel and lend their shapes to other discursive and institutional arenas, even to anthropology (cf 26, 27) . There is evidence of such traveling theoretical forms in at least three arenas within anthropology. It is visible, first, in those contem porary writings in anthropology (as well as critical theory, cultural studies, history, and other fields) in which the object of study is diaspora, deterritoriali zation, multiculturalism, migration, racism, ethnicity, "people of color," and related topics. Second, the classical concept of anthropological fieldwork is predicated on the kind of social, cultural, and geographic distance to which Kaplan refers. The anthropologist as stranger becomes, it is thought, seer and witness to the difference of "another culture." Third, anthropologists them selves, as intellectual figures, sometimes readily assume the alienated panache and worldliness of the exiled writer-seeking to connect themselves deeply (as deeply as possible) with another place or culture, and cultivating their alienation from and innocence of the "mundane," "garden-variety," "mass culture" of the societies in which they actually live and work most of the time. Levi-Strauss was, of course, quite literally in exile in New York, but many other anthropologists have [like Levi-Strauss in Tristes Tropiques (94) ] ended up celebrating the "conflation of literal exile with metaphoric representations of distance and loss" (76:15). Here we might think back to the story of Malinowski, in which anthropology was born from his "internment" in the Trobriands.
Seidel (142, cited in 76:22) has talked about how writers "have gained imaginative sustenance from exile" (cf 135:160). In her critical exploration of this move, Kaplan (76) asks, "Why does the concept of exile as aesthetic gain lend itself so well to expatriate and tourist alike (as well as to the exile)? How is it that the tourist can participate in exilic aesthetics without experiencing the prolonged effects of material exile?" Kaplan's motivation is to challenge the dehistoricization that is implicit in the aestheticization of exile.
In a longer review, it would be useful to trace how the axes of dehistoriciza tion and depoliticization that characterize much of "refugee studies" (see above) might dovetail with the tendencies that Kaplan has identified. Kunz (88, 89) , Stein (152), Berry (13), Miserez (112) , and others have written (mostly from a "refugee studies" perspective) of the "loss" of identity and culture that "uprooting" can exact. Tabori (156), Said (135) , Seidel (142) , Hemingway, Eagleton (34), Kitaj (83) , and others have discussed the aliena tion of artistic or literary exile, but many of them have placed a different valuation on this alienation (cf 24, 28, 75, 81) . Kaplan notes that literary exile can hold a kind of freedom and power. Persons huddled in masses under the refugee label are not thought of as seeking freedom or power in quite this way. But in both discursive realms, belonging (identity, community) and not be longing (uprooting, exile) to a place are spiritualized in a broad sense of the word. And this spiritualization can lead to dehistoricization and depoliticiza tion (106) .
The idealization or romanticization of exile and diaspora can be just as problematic for anthropology (and literary studies) as is the idealization of homeland and rooted communities in works of refugee studies. Both forms of idealization take for granted certain categorical forms of thought (104) , and both forms set up, as Kaplan has suggested, a "conventional opposition of origin and exile" (76:9).
ON BEING EMPLACED AND DISPLACED: BRIEF REMARKS
To orient this last discussion, I begin with a narrow methodological observa tion. Where there is war, violence, and mass displacement, one's eye quite naturally moves to the fleeing people who are about to become "refugees." There are innumerable good reasons to fo cus analytical attention on refugees, but it is also useful to look back at the scene of violence to discover what in it has not been foregrounded. In most cases of mass displacement-even in extraordinary situations of terror like Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi in 1993-there are people who do not become displaced, people who stay be hind, for whatever reason. In some cases they stay because they have nothing to fe ar, because they do not belong to a category marked for persecution-but not always. Thus, the question stands: What about those who stay? Are they not a part of the processes of mass upheaval in contexts like Rwanda and Burundi (105, 106)? Are they not connected to the people who fled? In many works of refugee studies, there is an implicit assumption that in becoming "torn loose" from their cultures, "uprooted" from their homes, refugees suffer the loss of all contact to the lifeworlds they fled. It is as if the place left behind were no longer peopled.
What does it mean to be, or to remain, emplaced? 13 This must remain an open question in the specific sense just outlined; but the question also helps us to move on to more general theoretical terrain. In writing anthropologically about refugees, it is useful to also ask, What is the state of not being a refugee like? How is it denoted? These questions lead into considerations of citizen ship and nationality, origins and nativeness, nationalisms and racisms, and of the concepts of identity, ethnicity, and culture-in short, all the theoretical surfaces that are still hot from recent rethinking in anthropology, cultural studies, and other fields (for key moments in this rethinking, see 4, 5, 8-11, 15, 16, 24, 29, 46, 50, 60, 61, 64, 113, 132, 133, 159, 171) . More comprehensive reviews of relevant literature are also available (39, 77, 170) .
Recent discussions of postcoloniality (171) , hybridity (15, 68, 150 ; S Lavie & T Swedenburg, manuscript in preparation), creolization (64) , transnational cultural forms (4, 5) , and diaspora (28, 49, 50, 62, (132) (133) (134) 159) are all enabling in that they insist on the analytical linkage made here between dis- placement and emplacement. These discussions do not assume the purity or naturalness, wholeness or wholesomeness of origins, identities, communities, cultural traditions, or nationalities. Instead, both displacement and emplace ment are seen as historical products, ever-unfinished projects. And. far from seeing displacement as obviously and necessarily constituting "a problem," these scholars see the study of the everyday facts of diaspora, movement, and displacement as a lens through which to examine the supposedly normal condition of being attached to a territorialized polity and an identifiable people (cf 60, 103). These relationships and processes occur in the context of a system of territorial national states. It is therefore useful to explicitly contextualize the study of refugees in this national order of things (103:37; 104), instead of taking this order as a given to such an extent that it becomes invisible.
The phenomena and connections at issue here-the movement of people, the international refugee regime, and the study of displacement--occur, then, in the national order of things, within what LOfgren has called an "interna tional cultural grammar of nationhood" (100). Just as power secretes knowl edge, the national order of things secretes displacement (176) , as well as prescribed correctives for displacement. Thus, the international refugee re gime, as defined by Zolberg et al (177) and others is inseparable from this wider national order of things, this wider grammar (cf 159). It is also in the context of this order that such phenomena as diaspora, hybridity, and postcolo niality are set.
Throughout this review, the use of an interdisciplinary lens has been ines capable and, one hopes, enabling. But interdisciplinarity in the study of dis placement is perhaps best seen not only as a matter of academic interdisci plinarity. It also seems necessary to identify and develop new engagements with organizations and governments that deal with issues of refugees and immigration, citizenship and sovereignty, human rights and other rights, as well as with the concept of humanitarian intervention. Until recently, it has appeared that "refugees and development" was a self-evident vector for more policy-oriented research in anthropology. But this is perhaps no longer quite such a natural connection. Thanks to the complex, historical conjunctures of the present moment, it is becoming more visible that "policy orientation" could, and should, mean more than it has tended to mean in practice up to now.
New directions for such work are suggested in the following passage from Foucault (101:437-438):
It seems to me that we have to keep in mind three principles: 1. There is such a thing as international citizenship which has its rights, which has its duties and which implies a commitment to rise up against any abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever the victims. After all, we are all governed ... and, by that token, our fates are bound up together.
2. Because they claim to look after the happiness of societies, governments arrogate to themselves the right to draw up profit-and-Ioss accounts for the human misery which their decisions provoke, or which their negligence causes. One of the duties of international citizenship is to reveal human misery to the eyes and ears of government, as it is not true that they are not responsible for it. Human misery must never be the silent residue of politics .... 3. We must reject the division of labour we are so often offered: it is up to individuals to become indignant and to talk; it is up to governments to think and to act. ... Amnesty International, Terre des Hommes and M€decins du Monde are the initiatives which have created this new right: the right of private individuals to intervene effectively in the order of international policies and strategies.
Foucault's concept of international citizenship might at first glance be taken to refer to the international order in which contemporary "refugee problems" are already being managed and in which humanitarian aid and legal protection efforts unfold-that is, the international refugee regime. But the political citi zenship to which Foucault appealed cannot easily be contained within the domesticated, "Small World" version of "the international order" or "the inter national community" that is so hegemonic now (cf 104). It is, precisely, subversive of the international grammar of nationhood and, if anything, harks back to the brief moment when, as Cooper pointed out, post-World War II discourses of internationalism were directed at transcending the national order of things.
Thus, a denaturalizing, questioning stance toward the national order of things presents itself as a promising site from which to identify new research directions in the study of refugees, exile, displacement, and diaspora-as well as for imagining new forms of political engagement. The first arena for re search in this spirit was already identified above: the study of emplacement (the flipside of displacement) in the national order of things. This leads di rectly into questions concerning nationality, citizenship, and the sovereign state. Much excellent work has appeared recently on citizenship (8, 10, 11, 61, 131) .
The implications of sovereignty have also been examined in a new light recently (cf 1:387; 47; 146:11). Challenges to sovereignty in cases of genocide (90) , in international peacekeeping (47) , and in the enforcement of human rights (11) are examples of instances where state sovereignty and the mass movement of people often collide. The actual form of these collisions would seem to be worth careful ethnographic study.
From these angles of view into the national order of things, it is only a short distance to the study of contemporary forms of international or supranational organizations and political orders. Gupta's work on the nonaligned movement (59), Ghosh's work on peace-keeping (47) , and Balibar's on racism, migra-tion, and European Union (10) provide excellent concrete road signs for fu ture work. They also push further the conceptualization of what Foucault called international citizenship. Gupta and Ghosh especially help to underscore the need to study, ethnographically, international organizations like the enormous UN apparatus. As Ghosh has observed, Of the many dramatic consequences of the end of the Cold War, few have been as notable as the sudden expansion in the international role of the United Nations .... It is no accident that the majority of the UN's peace-keeping operations have been in places that fall within anthropology's traditional domains-in Asia, Africa, and Central America .... In many of these places, peacekeeping operations will inevitably become harbingers of the future, not merely because of their immediate impact on the ebb and flow of politics, but also because they will serve as a political model, as a pattern of order and governance (42:412) .
It is in this context that the whole concept of humanitarian intervention also takes shape as an object of study (106) .
We return now to a connection that appeared at the beginning of this review: the connection between human rights and refugees. In almost any situation of violent mass displacement, the issue of human rights violations cannot be very distant (37) . Yet, just as with discourses of humanitarianism, the discourse of human rights sometimes seems grotesquely abstract and cere monial in the service of many of the very organizations (like the UN) that claim this discourse in their mandates. Balibar has rightly noted,
The rights of man have become, again, the absolute of political discourse. But little or practically nothing is heard about the politics of the rights of man, no questioning of its conditions, its forms or its objectives. Why this discretion? Either such a notion is considered to be self-evident ... [o]r it is considered to be contradictory, for (since they are either its absolute or its principle) the rights of man are always either beyond or above politics ... (11:205) .
People who are refugees can also find themselves quite quickly rising to a floating world either beyond or above politics, and beyond or above history-a world in which they are simply "victims." As I have tried to show elsewhere (105, 106) , it is this floating world without the gravities of history and politics that can ultimately become a deeply dehumanizing environment for refugees, even as it shelters. 
